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BOOK REVIEW
A TALISMAN AGAINST THE DARK FORCES
PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON
DEATH Row. By Edmund G. (Pat) Brown with Dick Adler. New
York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989. Pp. 171. $18.95.
The paths are similar. An individual commits a particularly bru-
tal crime or crimes, usually resulting in the killing of another per-
son. The local public is outraged and cries out forjustice. The state
legislature has responded to similar cries by enacting a statute pro-
viding for capital punishment for certain crimes. The politically
sensitive prosecutor prosecutes the individual's case as a capital
crime, demanding the death penalty. No plea bargain is made. The
jury finds the individual guilty and, instilled with the fear that the
sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole is illu-
sory, recommends the death penalty. The trial judge imposes the
sentence so recommended. The individual appeals the conviction,
and the appeals wind their way first through the state court system
to the state supreme court and then through the federal courts to
the United States Supreme Court. The conviction and sentence are
upheld, and the execution of the individual is scheduled.
The individuals are similar. The condemned individual proba-
bly has a family history involving a broken family, child abuse, or
neglect. He is probably of low intelligence, has a history of mental
problems, or abuses alcohol or drugs. The individual is probably
poor and uneducated, male, and either black or Hispanic; his victim
was probably white. The individual probably has a felony record.
Prior to his death sentence, he is probably represented by an over-
worked public defender or a court-appointed lawyer. He is proba-
bly guilty of the crime.
The last resort is the same. Years after the crime and the impo-
sition of the death sentence, in the face of execution, the individual
petitions the governor of the state for clemency. What has tran-
spired prior to this point is presumably justice, society's punishment
of an individual that has violated its laws imposed within the consti-
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tutional requirements of due process. The clemency petition is not
a request for further justice, at least of this type, but rather is a plea
for mercy. The governor must decide whether some factor exists
that compels him or her to prevent the execution of the individual
and commute his sentence to life imprisonment without possibility
of parole. The factors to be considered will most likely not be new;
they will have been considered by the prosecutor, the jury, the trial
judge, and the appellate courts. The governor is asked to be
merciful as well as just where these others have declined to be so.
Public Justice, Private Mercy: A Governor's Education on Death RowI is the
story of how a governor personally opposed to capital punishment
on moral grounds made such decisions.
Edmund G. (Pat) Brown served two terms as Governor of the
State of California from 1959 to 1967. During his term of office,
Governor Brown received fifty-nine such petitions for clemency
from individuals convicted of capital crimes and sentenced to death
by the courts of the State of California. In thirty-six cases, Brown
denied the petition and the prisoner went to the gas chamber. In
twenty-three cases, Brown granted the petition and commuted the
prisoner's sentence to life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
role. Public Justice, Private Mercy is Brown's attempt to answer his
question, "What had I, as a governor and a man, really learned from
these decisions-about the death penalty itself and the way we pun-
ish the worst members of our society?" 2
Governor Brown entered office with a pragmatic view of the
death penalty. While he had some personal reservations, he had
been elected by the people of the State of California to uphold and
to execute faithfully the laws of the state, which laws provided for
capital punishment.3 Brown approached his job with respect to the
clemency petitions with the mindset of a law enforcement officer,
having served seven years as the District Attorney for the City and
County of San Francisco and eight years as the Attorney General of
the State of California. Brown took an appropriately narrow view of
I E. BROWN, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY: A GOVERNOR'S EDUCATION ON DEATH
Row (1989).
2 Id. at xvi-xvii.
3 Id. at 36. Governor Brown states in the prologue to the book:
Taking office in 1959, I was almost certain that I knew how I felt about the death
penalty. To me it was a necessary evil, a deterrent against certain kinds of violent
crime, especially those committed with a loaded gun, and a needed emotional purge
for society. Most of all, the death penalty was the law of the state, one of the laws I
had sworn to uphold. If I disagreed with a law, it was my job to try to change it





the clemency power under the California Constitution. It was not
the governor's duty to answer the question of guilt or innocence or
to review "the finer points of the law"; this had been done by the
trial judge and jury and by the appellate courts, respectively.
Brown's role as governor was "to look for some extraordinary rea-
son why the defendant should not be executed,"4 to find a "legal or
moral reason to go against the judgment of the court."' 5 This role,
the clemency process, transformed Brown's personal reservations
concerning capital punishment to outright opposition to the death
penalty.
Governor Brown handled each clemency petition thoroughly
and personally. He was ably assisted by a series of three clemency
secretaries, Cecil F. Poole, Arthur L. Alarcon, and John S. McIn-
erny, each of whom was a "hardnosed, pro-capital-punishment for-
mer prosecutor" 6 and each of whom went on to a career as ajudge7
They reviewed the transcripts of the trial proceedings, the personal
histories of the condemned, any medical or psychiatric reports, the
coverage of and commentary on the crimes, trials and sentences in
the media, and correspondence from interested or concerned par-
ties. In each case, a clemency hearing was held.
In the end, however, the decision was up to Governor Brown
alone. He often "became in a very real sense a scale of justice,"8
called upon to weigh all of the good people of whom he had been
elected to take care against one bad person.9 While Brown was ap-
palled and angered by the crimes that had been committed, he at-
tempted to give each "subject human dimensions outside the
parameters of his crime"' 0 and find some unfairness or injustice that
would justify clemency.' 1 In twenty-three cases, he succeeded. In
thirty-six cases, however, he "couldn't find a compelling reason to
go against the judgment of the court and the law of the state."' 12
To the extent that Public Justice, Private Mercy is in any way an
apologia, it is more a defense by Governor Brown of the twenty-
three commutations to life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id. at 31.
6 Id. at xii.
7 Judge Poole and Judge Alarcon are currently Circuit Judges sitting on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Judge Mclnerny is currently a Superior
Court Judge sitting in Santa Clara County, California.
8 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 83.
9 Id. at 112.
10 Id. at 110.
11 Id. at 121-22.
12 Id. at 106-07.
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role than of the thirty-six denials of clemency. Brown discusses at
varying lengths twenty of the commutations, but only twelve of the
denials. As a minor quibble, one cannot help being curious about
the three commutations that were excluded, as well as the nature of
the other twenty-four denials. Brown's authorial technique is to re-
call the facts of the crime and the events leading to the imposition of
the death penalty; to relate the pertinent characteristics of the con-
demned individual; to describe the external factors, such as political
pressures, impacting his decision; and to discuss the factors that he
ultimately weighed. The stories, though simply told, are engaging,
and they effectively clothe the moral question of the rightness or
wrongness of capital punishment with a very human quality. Gover-
nor Brown is faithful to his premise of not inquiring into the guilt or
innocence of the clemency petitioners. In all fifty-nine cases, he was
certain that the individual was factually guilty of the crime. In only
two cases are procedural flaws in the individual's conviction dwelled
upon, and in both instances the matter was ultimately addressed by
the United States Supreme Court.' 3 In all fifty-nine cases, the
crimes were brutal and horrible, and Brown is unflinching both in
recounting the facts of each case and in reexamining his decision.
Governor Brown begins with the story ofJohn Russell Crooker,
Jr., his first and easiest clemency decision.' 4 Crooker's crime was a
crime of passion, as he murdered his former lover with a kitchen
knife after she shunned him. The issue of the coercion of Crooker's
confession was decided negatively by the United States Supreme
Court. ' 5 Brown commuted Crooker's sentence to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, basing his decision on Crooker's trou-
bled family history, psychiatric reports of his history of mental
problems and his mental deterioration on death row, 16 the absence
13 The Supreme Court held that John Crooker's confession was valid in Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), and held that Caryl Chessman had been denied due
process in the settling of the trial transcript in Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
14 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 3-19.
15 Crooker, 357 U.S. at 433.
16 Crooker, a former UCLA law student, wrote a description of life on death row
which was included in an influential book on capital punishment:
You awaken from the shock of the death verdict, unless you are one of those too sick
in the mind. You begin to resist death, study your legal case, listen, talk, read this
thing-the law- which has ordered you to be'put to death. Day after day you do
this, constantly, hour after hour. You learn something about this thing-the law:
that it is not a fine, straight line from crime to trial to punishment; that it is a broad,
waving line, where similar or worse crimes of the same type do not lead to the same
punishment; that it is also a line of several links, in which each link has the power
over the preceding link-only if you, yourself, usually poor and ignorant and friend-




of premeditation or a carried weapon, and Crooker's potential for
rehabilitation. Brown also makes the point, one frequently reiter-
ated in the book, that he could not see how taking Crooker's life
would deter future individuals from committing crimes of passion.
Before leaving office, Brown would further commute Crooker's sen-
tence to straight life. Crooker was eventually paroled and went on
to lead a peaceful and productive life.
Another "success story" is that of Erwin "Machine Gun"
Walker.1 7 Walker was convicted of killing a police officer in a gun
battle following the officer's attempt to arrest Walker for selling sto-
len goods. Walker had a history of mental problems exacerbated by
his experiences in World War II, as did his family, evidenced by sev-
eral suicides.' Walker's insanity plea at trial was denied, but he was
later determined to be insane following a suicide attempt on death
row, and thereby avoided execution for over twelve years. After re-
viewing this background and Walker's statements of contrition,
Brown commuted his sentence to life imprisonment without possi-
bility of parole on "the principle that the State of California did not
spend thousands of dollars and thousands of man hours in putting
together an admittedly broken mind only for the purpose now of
placing that body in the gas chamber."' 19 Too much time had
passed for any possible retributive purposes to be served by the
death penalty. Brown also further commuted Walker's sentence to
straight life on leaving office, and Walker went on to be a successful
designer of electronic technology after being paroled.
Not surprisingly, the book's longest chapter focuses on Gover-
nor Brown's most notorious clemency petitioner, Caryl Chessman.2 0
Chessman was a career criminal convicted of committing a series of
sexual attacks, robberies, and kidnappings. No lives were taken in
the course of these crimes, but Chessman received the death penalty
under California's "Little Lindbergh Law" 21 for kidnapping with in-
B. PRETrYMAN, DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT 253-54 (1961), quoted in E. BROWN, supra
note 1, at 17.
17 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 53-71.
18 Walker's father committed suicide after visiting his son on death row. Id. at 58.
19 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 70. Walker's prison psychiatrist had written to Brown
that "it almost seems that our society has healed the broken wing of the sparrow so that
it can again fly, and that our society is now, by analogy, ready to wring the sparrow's
neck." Id. at 66-67.
20 Id. at 20-52.
21 CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 1955). Brown was not alone in being troubled by
§ 209's provision for the death penalty for kidnappings that did not involve a killing.
See, e.g., Enright, California 's Aggravated Kidnapping Statute--A Need for Revision, 4 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 285 (1967); Note, Struggling with California's Kidnapping to Commit Robbery
Provision, 27 HASTINGS Lj. 1335 (1976). Section 209 was amended in 1977 to delete the
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tent to commit robbery. Chessman's flawed trial led to a Supreme
Court decision in his favor, 22 but he was convicted again on retrial
and again sentenced to death. Chessman authored three well-re-
ceived books23 in prison, and his case became a rallying point for
both proponents and opponents of capital punishment.24 Though
the deliberate plan of sexual attacks and robberies, the use of a
loaded gun, and Chessman's record of prior felonies served as part
of the basis for Brown's denial of Chessman's clemency petition, it
was Chessman's total lack of contrition or sympathy for his victims
and his persistent "heckling of his keepers" that turned off Brown's
compassion. Brown remains troubled by the execution to this day,
however, largely because of the absence of any killing, and he states,
"I should have found a way to spare Chessman's life." '25
By his own admission, Governor Brown's worst mistake was Ed-
ward Simon Wein. 26 Like Chessman, Wein was convicted of a series
of sexual attacks, robberies, and kidnappings that involved no killing
and was sentenced to death under the Little Lindbergh Law. Unlike
Chessman, however, Wein had no prior felony convictions and was
not a heckler of his keepers. Brown commuted his sentence to life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. Brown's mistake came
later when, as in Crooker's and Walker's cases, he further com-
muted Wein's sentence to straight life. Wein was eventually paroled
and subsequently committed a brutal murder. Brown's reflections
on the ultimate outcome of his decisions with respect to Wein are
poignant. 27
death penalty provision and to replace it with life imprisonment without possibility of
parole. CAL. PENAL CODE § 209 (West 1988).
22 Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156 (1957).
23 C. CHESSMAN, CELL 2455, DEATH Row (1954); C. CHESSMAN, THE FACE OFJUSTICE
(1957); C. CHESSMAN, TRIAL BY ORDEAL (1955).
24 It also received attention in the legal literature. See, e.g., Wirin & Posner, A Decade
of Appeals, 8 UCLA L. REV. 768 (1961) (questioning whether Chessman received due
process); Note, The Caryl Chessman Case: A Legal Analysis, 44 MINN. L. REV. 941 (1960)
(concluding that Chessman received due process).
25 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 52. Brown has previously criticized various aspects of
the Chessman case. See Brown, Alarcon & Cooper, The Death Penalty-The Caryl Chessman
Case: Irreversible Error, 11 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 21 (1983).
26 E. BROWN, supra note I, at 90-105.
27 Included in these reflections is an anecdote about a later meeting between Brown
and Crooker, who had known Wein in prison. Crooker told Brown how he wished that
he could have warned Brown prior to the second commutation, that he and the other
prisoners knew that Wein was mentally sick and dangerous. Brown states:
Crooker's comments stunned me into rare silence. The implications were at once
obviously simple and subtly ironic. Here was a man whose life I had spared at least
in part because of his intelligence and future potential, now out of prison and lead-
ing a useful life, telling me that he and other prisoners turned out to be better
judges of the inner nature of another man whose life I'd spared-better judges than
[Vol. 81
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The clemency decision that has troubled Governor Brown the
most in hindsight, however, is neither Chessman's nor Wein's. It is
that of Richard Arlen Lindsey, who was convicted of a horrifying
rape and murder of a small child. Though legally sane, Lindsey had
severe mental problems and a troubled family history. While Lind-
sey's crime "was the kind of crime which seemed to cry out for ven-
geance, for ritual punishment as swift and terrible as the act itself,"
Brown "couldn't for the life of [him] see how killing Lindsey would
keep another madman from attacking another little girl somewhere
down the road." 28 Brown's decision to deny clemency was not
based on any of these factors, however, but on politics. Brown had a
progressive farm labor bill in committee in the legislature and the
swing vote was that of the legislator from the county in which Lind-
sey's crime was committed. Brown let Lindsey die so that migrant
farm workers, such as the parents of Lindsey's victim, could earn a
decent minimum wage.
The most common characteristic of the prisoners whose death
sentences Governor Brown commuted, as well as those whose peti-
tions he denied, for that matter, is mental illness. Mental illness was
a factor in the commutations granted Crooker and Walker. Its ab-
sence was a factor of sorts in the denial of Chessman's petition. The
failure to diagnose the extent of Wein's mental illness led to
Brown's worst mistake, and its haunting presence in Lindsey's case
is a reason that that case has continued to trouble Brown.
Beginning with Vernon Atchley, a convicted murderer with an
IQ of 60, Brown routinely ordered the administration of elec-
troencephalograph (EEG) tests as part of the clemency process. 29 If
the EEG test revealed brain damage, Brown would commute. In ef-
fect, Brown took prisoners who had been found "sane" under the
M'Naghten Rule, then convicted and sentenced to death, and found
them "insane" under the Durham Rule and spared them. Under
this approach, James Merkouris, Bertrand Joseph Howk, and Clar-
ence Ashley had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole.s° Severe mental illness also was a ma-
jor factor in Brown's decisions to commute the sentences of Charles
a governor, several psychiatrists and a host of other skilled professionals. It seemed
to me then and ever since an almost perfect parable about the entire death-penalty
dilemma.
Id. at 104.
28 Id. at 83.
29 Id. at 80-83.
so Id. at 85-89. Merkouris's violent prison career ended in death. Id. at 85. Howk
committed suicide. Id. at 86. Ashley was eventually paroled and has maintained a clean
record since. Id. at 89.
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Golston, Earnest Leroy Jacobson, and Leo Lookado.3s
Like many individuals who generally oppose the death penalty,
Governor Brown identifies certain crimes for which, if it must exist,
it might have some minimal merit. Such crimes include felonies
such as robbery that are committed with a loaded gun and result in a
killing, on the basis that it might have some deterrent effect, and
murders for hire, on the basis that the mental intent element is so
clear. The use of a loaded gun in a robbery that resulted in murder
was a factor in the cases of Charley Luther Pike, Arlen Spencer, and
Dovie Carl Mathis.3 2 Though they did not use guns, the extremely
violent nature of both the criminals and their crimes was a factor in
the cases of Lawrence Jackson and Paul Eugene La Vergne.3 3 The
cases of Elizabeth "Ma" Duncan, Joseph Rosoto, John Vlahovich,
Donald Franklin, and Allen Ditson all involved premeditated
murders for hire.3 4 In all ten cases, Brown denied the petitions for
clemency and allowed the executions.35
Governor Brown was troubled by situations in which the impo-
sition of the death penalty with respect to a particular individual
represented disparate treatment of the condemned. The disparity
took several forms. In the case of Harold Almus Langdon, it was the
disparity between the crime-an attempted rape and kidnapping
under the Little Lindbergh Law that involved neither robbery nor
murder-and the p~inishment.3 6 In the case of Charles Evan
Turville, Jr., it was the disparity between his sentence and the sen-
tence received by his codefendant-life imprisonment without pos-
sibility of parole-because his codefendant was a minor.3 7 In the
case of Stanley Fitzgerald, it was a geographic disparity, as he was
given the death penalty in a rural locale for a murder that probably
would not have been tried as a capital case in an urban area.38 In
the case of Norman Whitehorn, it was disparity with respect to cul-
pability, as he received the death penalty while his codefendant, who
had done the actual killing, received a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole.3 9 In the case of Carlos Cisneros, Dit-
31 Id. at 135-40, 145-47.
32 Id. at 112-13, 114-15.
33 Id. at 113-14.
34 Id. at 107-12, 116-20.
35 Duncan was the only female clemency petitioner among the 59 Brown considered
and only the fifth woman to be executed in California; Brown expresses a repugnance
towards letting a woman die. Id. at 110.
36 Id. at 31.
37 Id. at 122-26. Turville was eventually paroled and has led an exemplary life. Id. at
126.
38 Id. at 126-28.
39 Id. at 132-35.
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son's codefendant, it was also disparity with respect to culpability, as
he was the ignorant dupe while Ditson was the mastermind of the
crime.40
The absence of deliberate premeditation-a contributing factor
in Governor Brown's decisions with respect to Crooker, Golston,
and Turville-was a central factor in other decisions to grant clem-
ency. The capital crimes committed by John Deptula and William
Earl Cotter, Jr. were crimes of.panic.41 Those committed by Clyde
Bates and Manuel Chavez were alcohol-inflamed crimes of rage.42
Finally, Brown's decision to grant clemency in the case of William
Lee Harrison was one of pure mercy.43 Harrison, was diagnosed
with terminal liver cancer and after the commutation it "soon took
the life that I was reluctant to charge to the already overloaded ac-
count of the State of California. '44
Public Justice, Private Mercy is an introspective, plainly written
book. Governor Brown recognizes that capital punishment "carries
a load of emotional baggage that makes it hard to discuss, especially
in the cool medium of print, without sounding pedantic or
preachy."' 45 He avoids both. While written without vitriol, the book
does deliver a powerful message against capital punishment. This
power flows in part from Brown's acknowledgment of the lasting
effect that the fifty-nine clemency decisions had on him personally.46
When he asks himself whether he would exchange the lives of the
twenty-three criminals whose death sentences he commuted for the
life of Wein's victim, 47 Brown's uncertainty as to his response is
both genuine and illustrative of the enormous demands that the
40 Id. at 117-20. Cisneros was eventually paroled, and has lived a religious and pro-
ductive life since. Id. at 120.
41 Id. at 129-30, 143-44.
42 Id. at 147-52. Bates and Chavez were eventually paroled and have caused no fur-
ther trouble. Id. at 152.
43 Id. at 130-32.
44 Id. at 132.
45 Id. at 154.
46 Governor Brown concludes the book with the following paragraph:
I am eighty-three years old as I write these words. I've done many things during my
life that have given me a great deal of pleasure and pride, and a few things that I'd
either like to forget or to have another chance at. But the longer I live, the larger
loom those fifty-nine decisions about justice and mercy that I had to make as gover-
nor. They didn't make me feel godlike then: far from it; I felt just the opposite. It
was an awesome, ultimate power over the lives of others that no person or govern-
ment should have, or crave. And looking back over their names and files now, de-
spite the horrible crimes and the catalog of human weaknesses they comprise, I
realize that each decision took something out of me that nothing-not family or
work or hope for the future-has ever been able to replace.
Id. at 163.
47 Id. at xiii, 102-03.
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clemency power makes of a public official. Wein was the only one of
the twenty-three to commit a subsequent crime. The record with
respect to the 430 non-capital felons to whom Brown granted reha-
bilitative pardons during his two terms as governor is even more
impressive: two convicted of subsequent felonies, one parole viola-
tor, and twenty-seven convicted of misdemeanors. 48
Politically, Governor Brown paid a high price for his principled
use of the clemency power and his personal opposition to capital
punishment.49 The twenty-three commutations were far more than
any previous governor of California; Earl Warren made just six com-
mutations in eighty-eight clemency cases, and Goodwin Knight
made six in forty-seven cases. Brown twice asked the California
Legislature for a moratorium on the death penalty, in 1960 and
1963. In each instance he lost in the Judiciary Committee by an
eight to seven vote. Richard M. Nixon used the issue against Brown
in the 1962 gubernatorial election, as did Ronald Reagan, success-
fully, in 1966. Brown remained steadfast in his duty as an elected
official to the end, refusing to issue blanket commutations to the
sixty-four prisoners on death row as he left office in 1967.50
As Governor Brown reflects on his fifty-nine clemency deci-
sions, he makes some passing observations concerning fundamental
problems with respect to capital punishment. As already noted,
Brown is troubled by the role insanity and other forms of mental
illness play in capital crimes and the imposition of the death penalty.
He makes a simple but effective argument for the "guilty but men-
tally ill" verdict to replace the "not guilty by reason of insanity"
verdict. 5 ' Brown recognizes the tenuous relationship between the
death penalty and the "next best" punishment-life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. The fact that the latter sentence can
be commuted to straight life by a governor in the future and can
lead to a future parole board granting parole is a factor in many
people's continued opposition to capital punishment. Skillful pros-
ecutors use this apprehension on the part of jurors to obtain death
sentences. 52 Brown is hesitant to take the power to commute a sen-
tence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole away from a
48 Id. at 104.
49 Id. at xiii, 20, 41-42, 51-52, 106, 121. It is interesting that, other than a passing
reference, id. at 14, Brown is silent concerning the impact that the capital punishment
issue had on the careers of his son, Governor Edmund G. (Jerry) Brown, and the
younger Brown's appointee as ChiefJustice of the California Supreme Court, Rose Bird.
50 Id. at 142. Brown commuted the sentences ofjust four of the 64 prisoners: Bates,
Chavez, Cotter, and Lookado. Id.
51 Id. at 84-89.
52 Id. at 104-05, 131-32.
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governor, because it denies him the "right to be humane and com-
passionate" in compelling cases, but he suggests "that it is more
humane and compassionate than forcing him to constantly decide
on the life or death of an individual.153
Governor Brown concludes Public Justice, Private Mercy with a
brief chapter which sums up what the fifty-nine clemency decisions
and his subsequent study of capital punishment has taught him. His
conclusions are simple and echo those reached by others. First, cap-
ital punishment does not deter crime.54 Second, the imposition of
the death penalty clogs and pollutes the legal system at both the
state and federal levels. 55 The long periods of time between the
crime and the death sentence and between the sentence and the ex-
ecution drain the death penalty of any marginal deterrent or retribu-
tive effect it may have had. State and federal courts are unable to
address some serious issues because of the time that must be spent
on writs and appeals made by death row prisoners. This lengthy
process guarantees neither protection against the execution of inno-
cent persons 56 nor racial equality.5 7 Finally, the death penalty dam-
53 Id. at 105 ("If we could guarantee that nobody who committed a capital crime
would ever get out of prison, there would be much less demand for the death penalty.").
54 Id. at 155-57. See W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1864-1982, 381-83 (1984); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 167-86 (1986); Gottlieb, The Death Penalty in the Legislature:
Some Thoughts About Money, Myth, and Morality, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 443, 452-55 (1989);
Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 555, 555-65.
55 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 157-61. See Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1035, 1038-41 (1989); Note, Pleas of the Condemned: Should Certiorari Petitions From
Death Row Receive Enhanced Access to the Supreme Court?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1120 (1984);
Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in the Federal
Courts, 95 YALE LJ. 349 (1985). Justice Powell has observed that "[b]oth the retributive
and deterrent purposes of capital punishment are imperiled by the current practice of
repetitive review." Powell, supra, at 1041.
56 Brown refers to Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). For subsequent debate on the subject, see Markham & Cassell,
Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988);
Bedau & Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markham and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV.
161 (1988).
57 See Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empiri-
cal Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); Baldus,
Woodworth & Pulaski, Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing Systems: Les-
sons from Georgia, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (1985); Barnett, Some Distribution Patterns for
the Georgia Death Sentence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1327 (1985); Gross, Race and Death: The
Judicial Evaluation of Evidence of Discrimination in Capital Sentencing, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1275 (1985), reprinted in altered form in S. GRoss & R. MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING chs. 8-10 (1989); Gross & Mauro, Patterns of
Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37
STAN. L. REV. 27 (1984), reprinted in altered form in S. GRoss & R. MAURO, supra, chs. 1-8;
Paternoster, Prosecutorial Discretion in Requesting the Death Penalty: A Case of Victim-Based
Racial Discrimination, 18 LAW & Soc'y REV. 437 (1984); Paternoster, Race of Victim and
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ages the legal system by its high costs in terms of public money.58
It has been suggested that there is little left to be said on the
subject of capital punishment.59 Indeed, a great deal has been
said. 60 What then does Public Justice, Private Mercy add to the litera-
ture concerning the death penalty?
First, Governor Brown's concerns with respect to capital pun-
ishment and the issues with which he wrestled in making his clem-
ency decisions provide a reflective yet fresh look at many of the
concerns and issues with which the United States Supreme Court
has had to deal since its moratorium on capital punishment in
Furman v. Georgia6' in 1972 was lifted in Gregg v. Georgia62 in 1976.63
The Supreme Court has shortened the catalog of crimes for
which the death penalty is permissible to include only crimes that
involve the taking of a life.64 Within this catalog of crimes, only the
individuals who participated actively in the killing may receive the
Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 754 (1983); Zeisel, Race Bias in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The
Florida Experience, 95 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1981); Comment, Racial Disparities and the Law of
Death: The Case for a New Hard Look at Race-Based Challenges to Capital Punishment, 10 NAT'L
BLACK LJ. 298 (1988).
58 See Kaplan, supra note 54, at 571-76; Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 241 (H. Bedau 3d ed. 1982); Comment, The Cost of Taking a
Life: Dollars and Sense of the Death Penalty, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221 (1985).
59 See, e.g., F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 54, at xiii; Lushing, Capital Punish-
ment: A Disputation, 42 ARK. L. REV. 105, 105 (1989). Professor Lushing goes on to state
that "it's not even plausible that everything possible has been said about capital punish-
ment." Lushing, supra, at 105.
60 See, e.g., H. BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN THE MORALITY, LAW, AND POLI-
TICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); R. BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES: THE SUPREME
COURT'S OBSTACLE COURSE (1982); W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND
THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1979); CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976); S. GETrINGER, SENTENCED TO DIE: THE PEO-
PLE, THE CRIMES, AND THE CONTROVERSY (1979); T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH
(1980); V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FORJUVENILES (1987); E. VAN DEN HAAG &J. CONRAD,
THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE (1983); W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHT-
IES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); Death
Penalty Symposium, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 865 (1985); Symposium on Current Death Penalty
Issues, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659 (1983); see also works cited supra notes 54-59
and infra notes 63, 67, 70, 72, 74, 79-80, 83, 88, 92-94.
61 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
62 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Gregg's companion cases were Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
63 For an overview of the status of the Court's efforts in this regard, see W. WHrrE,
supra note 60, at 4-30; Project- Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1987-88, 77 GEO. L.J. 489, 1151-1213 (1989).
64 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (rape); see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982) (robbery); Eberheart v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam) (kidnap-
ping); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam) (robbery).
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death sentence.6 5 The Court has reaffirmed that a death sentence
cannot be carried out with respect to a prisoner who is insane, 66 but
it has been less definitive in determining what role mental illness
short of insanity should play in the capital punishment process. 67 A
majority of the Court has yet to accept the consistent racially dispa-
rate application of the death penalty as a basis for constitutional
challenge. 68
The Supreme Court has determined the nature and role of the
juries that must decide 69 whether to sentence to death an individual
found guilty of a crime. The jury may be "death-qualified" by ex-
cluding jurors whose personal opposition to capital punishment
would preclude them from voting to impose a death sentence in all
instances. 70 The jury must be ftilly cognizant of its role in the capi-
tal punishment process and of its responsibility for the imposition of
65 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 782. But see Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (sufficient
that individual was a major participant in the felony and showed reckless indifference to
the killing).
66 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). But see Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct.
2934 (1989) (execution of retarded individual not categorically prohibited by eighth
amendment).
67 See, e.g,, Pemy, 109 S. Ct. at 2934 (failure to consider individual's mental retarda-
tion as a mitigating factor violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments); Satter-
white v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (use at capital sentencing stage of testimony of
psychiatrist concerning evaluation conducted without counsel violative of sixth amend-
ment); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (psychiatric evidence of probability of
further violence and dangerousness is permissible at capital sentencing stage); Eddings
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (failure to consider individual's history of emotional
disturbance as a mitigating factor violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments);
see Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on Implementing Supreme Court
Decisions, 79J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218 (1988); Liebman & Shepard, Guiding Capital
Sentencing Beyond the "Boiler Plate" Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEo. L.J. 757
(1978); Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Sentencing, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 291 (1989).
68 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (statistical data showing disproportion-
ate impact of capital punishment on blacks insufficient to sustain due process, equal
protection, or cruel and unusual punishment challenge under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments). The McCleskey decision was made in the face of substantial evidence of
racial bias at each stage of the capital punishment process. See S. GRoss & R. MAURO,
supra note 57, at 159-227; see also supra note 57 and infra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text.
69 The Court has held, however, that the Constitution does not require a jury deter-
mination of a death sentence. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); see also Clemons
v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441 (1990) (Court appears to hold that an appellate court may
be able to "salvage" a defective death sentence by reweighing aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances).
70 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985); see W. WHrrE, supra note 60, at 162-94; Cox & Tanford, An Alternative Method of
CapitalJury Selection, 13 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 167 (1989); Luginbuhl & Middendorf, Death
Penalty Beliefs and Jurors' Responses to Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Tri-
als, 12 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 263 (1988).
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the death penalty, 71 though it is permissible to instruct the jury con-
cerning the governor's ability to commute a sentence of life impris-
onment without possibility of parole to straight life.72
The Supreme Court has held that a death sentence cannot be
mandatory, 73 but rather must be based on the existence of one or
more aggravating factors. 74 Such circumstances may include the
criminal record of the convicted individual and the heinousness of
the crime, 75 but not evidence concerning the victim. 76 The capital
sentencing jury must be permitted to consider all mitigating factors
in reaching its decision,77 including family history and mental ill-
71 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (death sentence byjury which was led
to believe that responsibility for the ultimate result is elsewhere-the state supreme
court- is violative of the eighth amendment).
72 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983). The Ramos Court approved the use of
the "Briggs Instruction" to this effect in California as required by statute. CAl.. PENAL
CODE § 190.3 (West 1988). The "Briggs Instruction" was incorporated into the Califor-
nia Penal Code as the result of a 1978 voter initiative popularly known as the Briggs
Initiative. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 995. It no doubt at least partially represents a legacy of
Governor Brown's clemency decisions.
See Paduano & Smith, Death by Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the Impo-
sition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 211 (1987); Note, The Meaning of
"Life"for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REv. 1605
(1989); Comment,Jury Coercion in Capital Cases: How Much Risk Are We Willing To Take?,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1073 (1989).
73 Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). But see Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct.
1190 (1990).
74 Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356 (1988). The Court has not been particularly rigorous or consistent with respect to
this requirement. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988) (permissible that
sole aggravating circumstance was identical to an element of the capital crime); Barclay
v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (permissible for sentencer to consider evidence of crimi-
nal record even though not a permissible aggravating circumstance under state law);
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (permissible to carry out death sentence when
one of three aggravating circumstances subsequently held unconstitutional by state
supreme court). But see Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988) (impermissible to
base death sentence in part on an invalid felony conviction as an aggravating circum-
stance).
See Pillsbury, EmotionalJustice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CoR-
NELL L. REV. 655, 698-710 (1989); Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper
Consideration of Mitigating Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINws LJ. 409 (1990).
75 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
76 South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989) (impermissible to argue infer-
ences from victim's religious tract and voter registration card at capital sentencing
stage); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (impermissible to introduce victim im-
pact statement at capital sentencing stage).
77 Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987);
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
The Court recently held that a capital sentencing scheme requiring unanimity
among jurors with respect to any and each mitigating circumstance was impermissible
under the eighth amendment. McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990).
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ness.78 It is particularly noteworthy, if not ironic, in the context of
Governor Brown's book that the Court has implicitly concluded that
mercy need not be a consideration in the capital sentencer's
decision.79
Second, the book illustrates that the imposition of the death
penalty is unavoidably arbitrary. Even in the hands of a well-inten-
tioned and principled public official such as Governor Brown, the
ultimate result-that thirty-six people died for crimes for which
other criminals committing identical crimes did not-was basically
arbitrary. The path to death row is marked by numerous deci-
sions-whether or not to prosecute, who will prosecute, who to ap-
point as defense counsel, whether or not to plea bargain, whether or
not to seek the death penalty, which jurors to select, what instruc-
tions to give the jury, and whether or not to impose the sentence
recommended by the jury. If any one of these decisions is made in
the individual's favor, the path ends. It is asking a lot to conclude
that in any given case each of these decisions has been made in a
totally rational manner such that infliction of the death penalty at
the end of the path will not be arbitrary and capricious. 80
A review of the Supreme Court decisions since Gregg and the
related commentary81 identifies perhaps the most troubling source
of arbitrariness in the capital punishment process-the appellate re-
view of death sentences in the state courts, where the decision is
made whether or not to reverse the result of any of the foregoing
decisions. The Court has labored for thirteen years now at the task
of establishing an evenhanded, objective procedure for imposing
the death penalty in a rational manner. Even if the Court is ever
able to establish such a procedure, it appears increasingly clear that
78 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 1860 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982). But see Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987) (reasonable basis existed for coun-
sel not to raise age and family history as mitigating factors at capital sentencing stage).
79 See Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (jury instruction to "avoid any influence
of sympathy" not violative of eighth amendment); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164
(1988) (jury instruction as to "residual doubt of guilt" as a mitigating factor not consti-
tutionally required); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987) (jury instruction not to be
"swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice or public opinion
or feeling" not violative of eighth and fourteenth amendments); see also K. MOORE, PAR-
DONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1989); Peter & Pincu, Mercy and the
Death Penalty: The Last Plea, 10 CRIM.JUST.J. 41 (1987); Note, Reviving Mercy in the Struc-
ture of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE LJ. 389 (1989).
80 See C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE
(1974); B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1987).
Prosecutorial discretion is a significant but largely ignored source of arbitrary punish-
ment by death. B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, supra, at 152-58; W. WHITE, supra note 60, at 31-
50.
81 See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
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it will never be implemented in such a way as to avoid the starkly
disparate results of the procedure.8 2 State appellate courts seem
unwilling or unable to give capital cases both the procedural and the
proportionality review essential to the Supreme Court's scheme.83
And while the factor of race is recognized as the most compelling
example of the disparate impact of capital punishment, other factors
such as gender, socioeconomic status, geographic location, and cul-
pability remain as strong as they were when Governor Brown was
making his clemency decisions.8 4 Certain of these factors may be
relevant to an inquiry into the demographics of crime and criminals,
but their existence is unacceptable in the context of justifying the
most severe of all punishments for crime.
Third, the book is a strong piece of evidence refuting the argu-
ment that to oppose capital punishment is to be "soft on crime."
Contrary to his critics, Governor Brown's "opposition to the death
penalty is a deeply felt moral issue, not some offshoot of misguided
liberalism."85 Brown's career record shows that he was committed
to law enforcement and the punishment of criminals in a manner
that deters future crime, rehabilitates the criminal, and does not of-
fend our constitutional principles. People such as Brown who op-
pose capital punishment on moral grounds are just as troubled by
the terrible rate of crime, particularly violent crime, in the United
States as are proponents of the death penalty. They simply believe
that there are better solutions to the problem than further violence
in the form of state-sanctioned killings.
Because it is such a polarizing issue, however, like abortion and
gun control, abolitionists are better off not trying to convince reten-
tionists to change their moral view. Rather, abolitionists should
work to convince retentionists that the main justifications for capital
punishment- deterrence and retribution-are not being achieved
and that capital punishment can indeed have the totally opposite
82 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 184-85 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Arbi-
trariness continues so to infect both the procedure and substance of capital sentencing
that any decision to impose the death penalty remains cruel and unusual.").
83 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 64 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 437-42 (1980) (Marshall,J., dissenting). The Pulley majority held
that the eighth amendment does not require proportionality review by appellate courts
in every instance. See also B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, supra note 80, at 160-61; Dix, Appellate
Review of the Decision to Impose Death, 68 GEO. LJ. 97 (1979); Note, A Critical Evaluation of
State Supreme Court Proportionality Review in Death Sentence Cases, 73 IOWA L. REV. 719
(1988).
84 See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 67-68 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also W.
BOWERS, supra note 54, at 379-81.
85 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 151.
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results.8 6 It would be better to take the millions of public dollars,
the thousands of court hours and the other high costs of executing
the handful of criminals that have committed particularly heinous
crimes and reinvest them in other solutions to the very real problem
of crime, such as uncontrolled guns, drug and alcohol abuse, pov-
erty, lack of education, child abuse, untreated mental illness, and
deteriorating prison systems.
Fourth, the book leads the reader to consider again the possi-
bility that only direct exposure to the realities of the death penalty
will change the minds of proponents of capital punishment. Per-
haps soon the Supreme Court will finish its task of refining the pro-
cess-the crimes for which it may be imposed, the criminals who
may be executed, the selection of the jury that. will render it, the
instructions to such jury concerning its role, the nature of aggravat-
ing and mitigating factors to be considered by the sentencer, the
extent and quality of the appellate process-of imposing the death
sentence. Executions will resume. With over 2,400 prisoners on
death row nationwide, it will take several months or years to get rid
of the backlog. Only then will capital punishment lose the unreal
quality that it has attained and only then will "people begin to see
the death penalty in all its naked ugliness."87
This last point raises an important question. Should this sacri-
fice of human lives be made for however long it takes for a majority
of Americans to realize that capital punishment in any form is in-
compatible with "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society"?8 Or should judges, executives,
and legislators act in advance of the majority and turn their energies
and the public's money toward more sophisticated solutions to the
very real problems of crime and criminals? In nearly every other
Western industrial nation, the death penalty has been abolished. In
most instances, abolition has occurred because legislators have led
"from the front," and public opinion has followed.8 9 In the United
States, however, legislators tend to lead from the rear in terms of
public opinion, and the decision to abolish capital punishment
would presumably have to come from the Supreme Court.90
86 Gottlieb, supra note 54, at 458-60.
87 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 163. Since 1976, 130 prisoners have been executed in
14 predominantly southern states. N.Y. TimesJune 19, 1990, at A17, col. 1.
88 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death
Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 Sue. CT. REV. 317, 343 (resumption of executions may lead
to "natural experiment" that will prove (again) that capital punishment does not deter
crime).
89 F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 54, at 3-25.
90 Id. at 148-66.
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A strong majority of the current Supreme Court, however, be-
lieves that capital punishment does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment. Justices Brennan
and Marshall, who both dissented in Gregg,9 1 have remained
steadfast and often eloquent proponents of the belief that it does.9 2
The late former Justice Goldberg, an ardent opponent of capital
punishment who continued to urge the Supreme Court as a body to
change its view, 93 had nevertheless concluded that the abolitionist
attack must focus on the Congress, the legislatures of the thirty-
seven states that have death penalty statutes, and the state courts. 94
RetiredJustice Powell, a coauthor of Gregg and a believer in the con-
stitutionality of capital punishment, has recently concluded that, in
view of the seemingly insurmountable problems of implementing
the death penalty, "perhaps Congress and the state legislatures
should take a serious look at whether the retention of a punishment
that is being enforced only haphazardly is in the public interest."9 5
Finally, Public Justice, Private Mercy correctly identifies capital
punishment for what it really is-a symbol, "a kind of talisman
against the dark forces that surround and threaten us all." 96 The
American people are genuinely and justifiably afraid of the violent
crime that seems to pervade our society. The problem of violent
crime often appears insoluble, so Americans cling to the belief that
91 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Id. at 231
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
92 See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1452 (1990) (Brennan,J., concur-
ring and dissenting); Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Boyde v. California, 110 S. Ct. 1190, 1212 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 110 S. Ct. 1078, 1092 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting); John-
son v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 591 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367, 389 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356, 366 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246-47
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 547 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 392 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 439 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939, 974 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 904 (1983) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (Brennan, J., concurring); Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 619 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 304 (1977)
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); see also Marshall, Remarks on the Death Penalty
Made at the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1986).
93 Goldberg, The Death Penalty Revisited, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3 (1988).
94 Goldberg, Death and the Supreme Court, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 5-6 (1987).
95 Powell, supra note 55, at 1046.
96 E. BROWN, supra note 1, at 153.
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only by retaining the option of executing the worst of these violent
criminals will we have a chance. Politicians skillfully feed on this
fear, holding the death penalty aloft as a symbol of their commit-
ment to fight crime.97 They thereby obscure their consistent failure
to develop and implement more meaningful responses to their con-
stituents' concerns, making it even more unlikely that Congress and
the state legislatures will lead from the front and abolish capital
punishment.
Therefore, the burden is on the opponents of capital punish-
ment to continue to make their case and build up the evidence for
abolition. Governor Brown has made a significant contribution to
this cause with Public Justice, Private Mercy.
JOHN A. MACKERRON
VISITING ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW
THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO COLLEGE OF LAW
97 Gottlieb, supra note 54, at 458-60.
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